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Abstract
We study how intermediation and asset prices in over-the-counter
markets are affected by illiquidity associated with search and bargain-
ing. We compute explicitly the prices at which investors trade with
each other as well as marketmakers’ bid and ask prices in a dynamic
model with strategic agents. Bid-ask spreads are lower if investors
can more easily find other investors, or have easier access to multiple
marketmakers. With a monopolistic marketmaker, bid-ask spreads
are higher if investors have easier access to the marketmaker. We
characterize endogenous search and welfare, and discuss empirical im-
plications.
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In over-the-counter (OTC) markets, an investor who wishes to sell must
search for a buyer, incurring opportunity or other costs until one is found.
Some OTC markets therefore have intermediaries. Contact with relevant
intermediaries, however, is not immediate. Often, intermediaries must be
approached sequentially. Hence, when two counterparties meet, their bilat-
eral relationship is inherently strategic. Prices are set through a bargaining
process that reflects each investor’s or marketmaker’s alternatives to imme-
diate trade.
These search-and-bargaining features are empirically relevant in many
markets, such as those for mortgage-backed securities, corporate bonds, emerging-
market debt, bank loans, derivatives, and certain equity markets. Also, real-
estate values are influenced by imperfect search, the relative impatience of
investors for liquidity, outside options for trade, and the role and profitability
of brokers.
We build a dynamic asset-pricing model capturing these features, and
analytically derive the equilibrium allocations, prices negotiated between in-
vestors, as well as marketmakers’ bid and ask prices. We show how these
equilibrium properties depend on investors’ search abilities, marketmaker
accessibility, and bargaining powers. We determine the search intensities
that marketmakers choose, and derive the associated welfare implications of
investment in marketmaking.
Our model of search is a variant of the coconuts model of Diamond
(1982).1 A continuum of investors contact each other, independently, at
some mean rate λ, a parameter reflecting search ability. Similarly, market-
makers contact agents at some intensity ρ that reflects dealer availability.
When agents meet, they bargain over the terms of trade. Gains from trade
arise from heterogeneous costs or benefits of holding assets. For example, an
asset owner can be anxious to sell because of a liquidity need or because of
hedging motives. Marketmakers can off-load their inventories in a frictionless
inter-dealer market and trade with investors, capturing part of the difference
between the inter-dealer price and investors’ reservation values.
Asset pricing with exogenous trading frictions has been studied by Ami-
1Our model differs from Diamond (1982), and the labor literature more generally, by
considering repeated trade of long-lived assets. The monetary search literature (for exam-
ple, Kiyotaki and Wright (1993)) also considers long-lived assets, but, with the exception
of Trejos and Wright (1995), it considers exogenous prices. Our model has similarities
with that of Trejos and Wright (1995), but their objectives are different and they do not
study marketmaking. See also Harris (1979).
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hud and Mendelson (1986), Constantinides (1986), and Vayanos (1998). We
endogenize the trading frictions arising through search and bargaining, and
show their effects on asset prices. In follow-up work, Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and
Pedersen (2003) extend the model developed here in order to characterize the
impact on asset pricing of search in settings with risk aversion and risk lim-
its, while Weill (2002) and Vayanos and Wang (2002) consider cross-sectional
asset pricing in extensions with multiple assets.
Market frictions have been used to explain the existence and behavior
of marketmakers. Notably, marketmakers’ bid and ask prices have been ex-
plained by inventory considerations (Garman (1976), Amihud and Mendelson
(1980), and Ho and Stoll (1981)), and by adverse selection arising from asym-
metric information (Bagehot (1971), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Kyle
(1985)). In contrast, we model marketmakers who have no inventory risk
because of the existence of inter-dealer markets, and our agents are symmet-
rically informed. In our model, bid and ask prices are set in light of investors’
outside options, which reflect both the accessibility of other marketmakers
and investors’ own abilities to find counterparties.
We show that bid-ask spreads are lower if investors can find each other
more easily.2 The intuition is that improving an investor’s search alternatives
forces marketmakers to give better prices. This result is supported by the
experimental evidence of Lamoureux and Schnitzlein (1997).
An investor also improves his bargaining position relative to a market-
maker if he can more easily find other marketmakers. Hence, despite the
bilateral nature of bargaining between a marketmaker and an investor, mar-
ketmakers are effectively in competition with each other over order flow,
given the option of investors to search for better terms. Consistent with this
intuition, we prove that competitive prices and vanishing spreads obtain as
marketmakers’ contact intensities become large, provided that marketmakers
do not have all of the bargaining power.
In summary, if investors are more sophisticated (that is, have better ac-
cess to other investors or to marketmakers who do not have total bargaining
power), they receive a tighter bid-ask spread. This implication sets our theory
2We show that our model specializes in a specific way to the standard general-
equilibrium paradigm as bilateral trade becomes increasingly active, under conditions
to be described, extending a chain of results by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), Gale
(1987), Gale (1986a), Gale (1986b), and McLennan and Sonnenschein (1991), in a manner
explained later in our paper. Thus, “standard” asset-pricing theory is not excluded, but
rather is found at the end of the spectrum of increasingly “active” markets.
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of intermediation apart from information-based models, in which more so-
phisticated (that is, better informed) investors receive a wider bid-ask spread.
In an extension with heterogeneous investors in the same OTC market,
we show that more sophisticated investors (those with better access to mar-
ketmakers) receive tighter bid-ask spreads because of their improved outside
options. Hence, this result holds both when comparing across markets and
when comparing across investors in the same market. This sets our theory
apart from inventory-based models, since these would not imply differential
treatment across investors.3 Further, in the heterogeneous-agents extension,
investors with lower search ability may refrain entirely from trade.
Our result seems consistent with behavior in certain OTC markets, such
as those for interest-rate swaps and foreign exchange, in which asymmetric
information is limited. Anecdotal evidence suggests that “sales traders” give
more competitive prices to sophisticated investors, perceived to have better
outside options.
We also consider the case in which the marketmaker has total bargaining
power. The bid-ask spread of such a monopolistic marketmaker vanishes as
investors are increasingly able to meet each other quickly, as with the case
of competing marketmakers. In contrast, however, more frequent contact
between investors and a monopolistic marketmaker actually widens spreads,
because of the investors’ poorer outside options. Specifically, an investor’s
threat to find a counterparty himself is less credible if the marketmaker has
already executed most of the efficient trades, making it harder to find poten-
tial counterparties.
Our results regarding the role of investors’ searches for each other on
dealer spreads are similar in spirit to those of Gehrig (1993) and Yavas¸ (1996),
who consider monopolistic marketmaking in one-period models.4 We show
that dynamics have an important effect on agents’ bargaining positions, and
thus asset prices, bid-ask spreads, and investments in marketmaking capac-
ity. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) study the complementary effects of
marketmaker inventory and consignment agreements in a dynamic search
model.
3We note that, when comparing across markets, inventory considerations may have the
same bid-ask implication as our search model, because more frequent meetings between
investors and marketmakers may result in lower inventory costs.
4See also Bhattacharya and Hagerty (1987) who introduce dealers into the Diamond
(1982) model, and Moresi (1991) who considers intermediation in a search model in which
buyers and sellers exit the market after they trade.
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We consider marketmakers’ choices of search intensity, and the social
efficiency of these choices. A monopolistic marketmaker imposes additional
“networking losses” on investors because his intermediation renders less valu-
able the opportunity of investors to trade directly with each other. A mo-
nopolistic marketmaker thus provides more intermediation than is socially
efficient. Competitive marketmakers may provide even more intermediation,
as they do not consider, in their allocation of resources to search, the effect
that their intermediation has on the equilibrium allocation of assets among
investors.5
1 Model
We fix a probability space (Ω,F , P r) and a filtration {Ft : t ≥ 0} of sub-σ-
algebras satisfying the usual conditions, as defined by Protter (1990). The
filtration represents the resolution over time of information commonly avail-
able to agents.
Two kinds of agents, investors and marketmakers, consume a single non-
storable consumption good that is used as a numeraire. All agents are risk-
neutral and infinitely lived, with time preferences determined by a constant
discount rate r > 0. Marketmakers hold no inventory and maximize profits.
Investors have access to a risk-free bank account with interest rate r
and to an OTC market for a “consol,” meaning an asset paying dividends
at the constant rate of 1 unit of consumption per year.6 The consol can
be traded only when an investor finds another investor or a marketmaker.
The associated search processes are described below. The bank account can
also be viewed as a liquid security that can be traded instantly. We require
that the value Wt of the bank account be bounded below, ruling out Ponzi
schemes.
A fraction s of investors are initially endowed with one unit of the asset.
Investors can hold at most one unit of the asset and cannot shortsell. Because
agents have linear utility, we can restrict attention to equilibria in which, at
5Studying endogenous search in labor markets, Mortensen (1982) and Hosios (1990)
find that agents may choose inefficient search levels because they do not internalize the
gains from trade realized by future trading partners. Moen (1997) shows that search
markets can be efficient under certain conditions.
6Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2003) consider extensions with risky securities and
risk-averse investors.
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any given time and state of the world, an investor holds either 0 or 1 unit of
the asset.
An investor is characterized by whether he owns the asset or not, and by
an intrinsic type that is “high” or “low.” A low-type investor, when owning
the asset has a holding cost of δ per time unit. A high-type investor has no
such holding cost. There are multiple interpretations of the investor types.
For instance, a low-type investor may have (i) low liquidity (that is, a need
for cash), (ii) high financing costs, (iii) hedging reasons to sell,7 (iv) a relative
tax disadvantage,8 or (v) a lower personal use of the asset. Any investor’s
intrinsic type switches from low to high with intensity λu, and switches back
with intensity λd. For any pair of investors, their intrinsic-type processes are
assumed to be independent.
The full set of investor types is T = {ho, hn, lo, ln}, with the letters “h”
and “l” designating the investor’s intrinsic liquidity state, as above, and with
“o” or “n” indicating whether the investor owns the asset or not, respectively.
We suppose that there is a “continuum” (a non-atomic finite-measure
space) of investors, and let µσ(t) denote the fraction at time t of investors of
type σ ∈ T . Because the fractions of each type of investor add to 1 at any
time t,
µho(t) + µhn(t) + µlo(t) + µln(t) = 1. (1)
Because the total fraction of investors owning an asset is s,
µho(t) + µlo(t) = s. (2)
A pair of investors can negotiate a trade of the consol whenever they meet,
for a mutually agreeable number of units of current consumption. (The de-
termination of the terms of trade is to be addressed later.) Investors meet,
however, only at random times, in a manner idealized as follows. At the
successive event times of a Poisson process with some intensity parameter
λ, an investor contacts another agent, chosen from the entire population
“at random,” meaning with a uniform distribution across the investor pop-
ulation.9 Random switches in intrinsic types types are independent of the
matching processes. Hence, an investor contacts an investor from a group D
7Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2003) explore this interpretation in an extension with
risk aversion.
8Dai and Rydqvist (2003) provide a tax example with potential search effects.
9The exponential inter-contact-time distribution is natural, as it would arise from
5
with intensity λµD, where µD is the fraction of D investors in the population.
Thus, another group C of investors contact group D investors at a total rate
of λµCµD. Since group D investors contact C investors at the same total
rate, the total meeting intensity between the two groups is 2λµCµD.
Marketmakers are also found through search, implying that an investor
must bargain with marketmakers sequentially, as they are found. There is a
unit mass of independent non-atomic marketmakers with a fixed intensity, ρ,
of meeting an investor.10 When an investor meets a marketmaker, they bar-
gain over the terms of trade as described in the next section. Marketmakers
have access to an immediately accessible inter-dealer market, on which the
unload their positions, so that they have no inventory at any time.
Certain over-the-counter markets do not have marketmakers. Such mar-
kets are, of course, described by the special case of our model with ρ = 0.
Hence, our results to follow characterize allocations and inter-investor prices
both with and without marketmakers.
2 Dynamic Search Equilibrium with Compet-
ing Marketmakers
In this section, we explicitly compute the allocations and prices forming
a dynamic search-and-bargaining equilibrium. In particular, we compute
the price negotiated directly between investors, marketmaker’s bid and ask
prices, and the inter-dealer price.
In equilibrium, low-type asset owners want to sell and high-type non-
owners want to buy. When two such agents meet, they bargain over the
price. Similarly, when investors meet a marketmaker, they bargain over
the price. An investor’s bargaining position depends on his outside option,
which in turn depends on the availability of other counterparties, both now
and in the future, and a marketmaker’s bargaining position depends on the
inter-dealer price. In deriving the equilibrium, we rely on the insight from
Bernoulli (independent success-failure) contact trials, with a success probability of λ∆
during a contact-time interval of length ∆, in the limit as ∆ goes to zero. The analysis
further relies on independence assumptions and an application of the law of large numbers,
formalized in Duffie and Sun (2004). (See, also, Footnote 13).
10It would be equivalent to have a mass k of dealers with contact intensity ρ/k, for any
k > 0.
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bargaining theory that trade happens instantly.11 This allows us to derive a
dynamic equilibrium in two steps. First, we derive the equilibrium masses of
the different investor types. Second, we compute agents’ value functions and
transaction prices (taking as given the masses).
Assuming that the law of law of large numbers applies (see Duffie and Sun
(2004)), the rate of change of the mass µlo(t) of low-type owners is almost
surely
µ˙lo(t) = − (2λµhn(t)µlo(t) + ρµm(t))− λuµlo(t) + λdµho(t), (3)
where µm(t) = min{µlo(t), µhn(t)}. The first term in (3) reflects the fact that
agents of type hn contact those of type lo at a total rate of λµhn(t)µlo(t), while
agents of type lo contact those of type hn at the same total rate λµhn(t)µlo(t).
At both of these types of encounters, the agent of type lo becomes one of type
ln. This implies a total rate of reduction of mass due to these encounters
of 2λµhn(t)µlo(t). Similarly, investors of type lo meet marketmakers with a
total contact intensity of ρµlo(t). If µlo(t) ≤ µhn(t) then all these meetings
lead to trade, and the lo agent becomes a ln agent, resulting in a reduction
of µlo of ρµlo(t). If µlo(t) > µhn(t), then not all these meetings result in
trade. This is because marketmakers buy from lo investors and sell to hn
investors, and, in equilibrium, the total intensity of selling must equal the
intensity of buying. Marketmakers meet lo-investors with total intensity ρµlo
and hn-investors with total intensity ρµhn, and, therefore, investors on the
“long side” of the market are rationed. In particular, if µlo(t) > µhn(t) then
lo agents trade with marketmakers only at the intensity ρµhn. In equilibrium
this rationing can be the outcome of bargaining because the marketmaker’s
reservation value (that is, the inter-dealer price) is equal to the reservation
value of the lo-investor.
Finally, the term λuµlo(t) reflects the migration of owners from low to
high intrinsic types, and the last term λdµho(t) reflects owners’ change from
high to low intrinsic types.
11In general, bargaining leads to instant trade when agents do not have asymmetric
information. Otherwise there can be strategic delay. In our model, it does not matter
whether agents have private information about their own type for it is common knowledge
that a gain from trade arises only between between agents of types lo and hn.
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The rate of change of the other investor-type masses are,
µ˙hn(t) = − (2λµhn(t)µlo(t) + ρµm(t)) + λuµln(t)− λdµhn(t) (4)
µ˙ho(t) = (2λµhn(t)µlo(t) + ρµm(t)) + λuµlo(t)− λdµho(t) (5)
µ˙ln(t) = (2λµhn(t)µlo(t) + ρµm(t))− λuµln(t) + λdµhn(t). (6)
As in (3), the first terms reflect the result of trade, and the last two terms
are the result of intrinsic-type changes.
In most of the paper we focus on stationary equilibria, that is, equilibria
in which the masses are constant. In our welfare analysis, however, it is more
natural to take the initial masses as given, and, therefore, we develop some
results with any initial mass distribution. The following proposition asserts
the existence, uniqueness, and stability of the steady state.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique constant steady-state solution to (1)–
(6). From any initial condition µ(0) ∈ [0, 1]4 satisfying (1) and (2), the
unique solution µ(t) to (3)–(6) converges to the steady state as t→∞.
A particular agent’s type process {σ(t) : −∞ < t < +∞} is, in steady-state,
a 4-state Markov chain with state space T , and with constant switching
intensities determined in the obvious way12 by the steady-state population
masses µ and the intensities λ, λu, and λd. The unique stationary distribution
of any agent’s type process coincides with the cross-sectional distribution µ
of types characterized13 in Proposition 1.
Turning to the determination of an equilibrium transaction prices, we
first conjecture, and verify shortly, a natural steady-state equilibrium utility
for remaining lifetime consumption.
With these equilibrium masses, we will determine the price P negotiated
directly between lo and hn investors, the “bid” price B at which investors
12For example, the transition intensity from state lo to state ho is λu, the transition
intensity from state lo to state ln is 2λµhn, and so on, for the 4× 3 switching intensities.
13This is a result of the law of large numbers, in the form of Theorem C of Sun (2000),
which provides the construction of our probability space (Ω,F , P r) and agent space [0, 1],
with an appropriate σ-algebra making Ω× [0, 1] into what Sun calls a “rich space,” with
the properties that: (i) for each individual agent in [0, 1], the agent’s type process is
indeed a Markov chain in T with the specified generator, (ii) the unconditional probability
distribution of the agents’ type is always the steady-state distribution µ on T given by
Proposition 1, (iii) agents’ type transitions are almost everywhere pair-wise independent,
and (iv) the cross-sectional distribution of types is also given by µ, almost surely, at each
time t.
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sell to marketmakers, the “ask” price A at which investors buy from market-
makers, and the inter-dealer price. For this, we use dynamic programming,
by first computing an investor’s utility at time t for remaining lifetime con-
sumption. For a particular agent this “value function” depends, naturally,
only on the agent’s current type σ(t) ∈ T , the current wealth Wt in his bank
account, and time. Because of risk neutrality, the value function has the
form Wt + Vσ(t)(t). Because any budget-feasible consumption withdrawals
from liquid wealth is optimal, we simply assume that agents adjust their
consumption so that Wt = 0 for all t. As shown in the appendix, the value
functions satisfy:
V˙lo = rVlo − λu(Vho − Vlo)− 2λµhn(P + Vln − Vlo)− ρ(B + Vln − Vlo)− (1− δ)
V˙ln = rVln − λu(Vhn − Vln)
V˙ho = rVho − λd(Vlo − Vho)− 1 (7)
V˙hn = rVhn − λd(Vln − Vhn)− 2λµho(Vho − Vhn − P )− ρ(Vho − Vhn − A),
where the value functions (Vσ), prices (P,A,B), and masses (µσ), depend on
time unless the initial masses are the steady-state ones.
These value functions imply that an lo-investor benefits from a sale at any
price greater than Vlo − Vln, and an hn-investor will benefit from a purchase
at any price smaller than Vho − Vhn. Bargaining between the investors leads
to a price between these two values. Specifically, Nash (1950) bargaining
with seller bargaining power of q ∈ [0, 1] yields
P = (Vlo − Vln)(1− q) + (Vho − Vhn)q. (8)
This is also the outcome of the simultaneous-offer bargaining game described
in Kreps (1990), and of the alternating-offers bargaining game in Duffie,
Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2003).
Similarly, the bid and ask prices are determined through a bargaining
encounter between investors and marketmakers in which a marketmaker’s
outside option is to trade in the interdealer market at a price of M . Mar-
ketmakers have a fraction, z ∈ [0, 1], of the bargaining power when facing an
investor. Hence, a marketmaker buys from an investor at the bid price B,
and sells at the ask price A, determined by
A = (Vho − Vhn)z +M (1− z) (9)
B = (Vlo − Vln)z +M (1− z). (10)
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As discussed above, in equilibrium, the marketmakers and the investors
on the long side of the market must be indifferent to trading. Hence, if
µlo ≤ µhn, marketmakers meet more potential buyers than sellers. The inter-
dealer price, M , is therefore equal to the ask price, A, and to any buyer’s
reservation value, Vho−Vhn. Similarly, if µlo > µhn, then M = B = Vlo−Vln.
In steady state, it is easy to see which side of the market is rationed
because the steady-state fraction of high-type agents is λu(λd + λu)
−1, so we
have
µhn + (s− µlo) = λu
λd + λu
.
Hence, µlo < µhn in steady state if and only if the following condition is
satisfied.
Condition 1 s < λu/(λu + λd).
The equations for prices and value functions can be solved explicitly.
Condition 1 seems the natural case, and the solution in that case is given by
the following theorem; the complementary case is treated in the appendix.
Theorem 2 For any given initial mass distribution µ(0), there exists a subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium. There is a unique steady-state equilibrium. Under
Condition 1, the ask, bid, and inter-investor prices are
A =
1
r
− δ
r
λd + 2λµlo(1− q)
r + λd + 2λµlo(1− q) + λu + 2λµhnq + ρ(1− z) (11)
B =
1
r
− δ
r
zr + λd + 2λµlo(1− q)
r + λd + 2λµlo(1− q) + λu + 2λµhnq + ρ(1− z) (12)
P =
1
r
− δ
r
(1− q)r + λd + 2λµlo(1− q)
r + λd + 2λµlo(1− q) + λu + 2λµhnq + ρ(1− z) . (13)
These explicit prices are intuitive. Each price is the present value, 1/r, of
dividends, reduced by an illiquidity discount. All of these prices decrease
in the bargaining power, z, of the marketmaker, because a higher z makes
trading more costly for investors. The prices increase, however, in the ease
of meeting a marketmaker (ρ) and in the ease of finding another investor (λ),
provided ρ and λ are large enough. The interesting effects of high search
intensities are discussed in detail in Section 4.
From Theorem 2, the bid-ask spread (A−B) is increasing in the market-
maker’s bargaining power z. The bid-ask spread is decreasing in λ, since a
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high λ means that an investor can easily find a counterparty himself, which
improves his bargaining position. The bid-ask spread is also decreasing in ρ,
provided z < 1 and ρ is sufficiently large. A higher ρ implies that an investor
can quickly find another marketmaker, and this “sequential competition” im-
proves his bargaining position. If z = 1, however, then the bid-ask spread is
increasing in ρ. The case of z = 1 is best interpreted as a monopolistic mar-
ketmaker as we show in the next section. These comparative-statics results
can be derived from the price equations (11)–(13) and from Equation (A.2),
which characterizes the steady-state investor masses.
3 Monopolistic Marketmaking
We assume here that investors can trade with the monopolistic marketmaker
only when they meet one of the marketmaker’s non-atomic “dealers.” There
is a unit mass of such dealers who contact potential investors randomly and
pair-wise independently, letting ρ be the intensity with which a dealer con-
tacts a given agent.
Dealers instantly balance their positions with their marketmaking firm,
which, on the whole, holds no inventory. When an investor meets a dealer, the
dealer is assumed to have all of the bargaining power since the marketmaker’s
profit is not affected by any one infinitesimal trade. Hence, the dealer quotes
an ask price, A, and a bid price, B, that are, respectively, a buyer’s and a
seller’s reservation value.
With these assumptions, the equilibrium is computed as in Section 2.
The masses are determined by (3)–(6) and the prices are given by Theorem 2
with z = 1. In equilibrium, B ≤ P ≤ A.
It might seem surprising that a single monopolistic marketmaker is equiv-
alent for pricing purposes to many “competing” non-atomic marketmakers
with full bargaining power (z = 1). The result follows from the fact that a
search economy is inherently un-competitive, in that each time agents meet,
a bilateral bargaining relationship obtains. With many non-atomic market-
makers it is, however, more natural to assume that z < 1, and, hence, this
difference in marketmaker bargaining power distinguishes the two kinds of
intermediation. The distinction between monopolistic and competitive mar-
ketmakers is clearer when search intensities are endogenized in Section 7.
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4 Fast Search Leads to Competitive Prices?
A competitive Walrasian equilibrium is characterized by a single price process
at which agents may buy and sell instantly, such that supply equals demand
in each state and at every point in time. A Walrasian allocation is efficient
and all assets are held by agents of high type, if there are enough such
agents,14 which is the case in steady state if s < λu/(λu+λd). If s > λu/(λu+
λd), all high-type agents own assets, and the rest of the assets are held by
low-type investors. Finally, if s = λu/(λu +λd), the number of sellers is equal
to the number of buyers.
In the former case, the unique Walras equilibrium has agent masses
µ∗ho = s
µ∗hn =
λu
λu + λd
− s (14)
µ∗lo = 0
µ∗ln =
λd
λu + λd
,
and the Walrasian price is
P ∗ = Et
[∫ ∞
0
e−rs ds
]
=
1
r
.
The Walras equilibrium price, a version of what is sometimes called the
“Gordon dividend growth model” of valuation, is the reservation value of
holding the asset forever for a hypothetical investor who is always of high
type.
In case of s > λu/(λu+λd), the masses are determined similarly and since
the marginal investor has low liquidity, the Walrasian price is the reservation
value of holding the asset indefinitely for a hypothetical agent who is perma-
mently of low type (that is, P ∗ = (1− δ)/r). If s = λu/(λu + λd), then any
price P ∗ between 1/r and (1− δ)/r is a Walrasian equilibrium.
Clearly, fast search by either investors or marketmakers implies that al-
locations approach the efficient allocations, µ∗, prevailing in a Walrasian
market. The following theorem further determines the circumstances under
which prices approach the competitive Walrasian prices, P ∗.
14The quantity of such agents can be thought, for instance, as the capacity for taking a
certain kind of risk.
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Theorem 3 Let (λk, ρk, µk, Bk, Ak, P k) be a sequence of stationary search
equilibria.
1. [Fast investors.] If λk →∞, (ρk) is any sequence, and 0 < q < 1 then
µk → µ∗, and Bk, Ak, and P k converge to the same price, which is
Walrasian.
2. [Fast competing marketmakers.] If ρk →∞, (λk) is any sequence, and
z < 1 then µk → µ∗, and Bk, Ak, and P k converge to the same price,
which is Walrasian.
3. [Fast monopolistic marketmaker.] If λk = λ is constant, ρk →∞ is an
increasing sequence, and z = 1, then µk → µ∗ and the bid-ask spread,
Ak −Bk, is increasing.
Part one shows that prices become competitive and that the bid-ask
spread approaches zero as investors find each other more quickly, regard-
less of the nature of intermediation. In other words, the investors’ search
alternative forces the marketmakers to offer relatively competitive prices,
consistent with the evidence of Lamoureux and Schnitzlein (1997).15
Part two shows that fast intermediation by competing marketmakers also
leads to competitive prices and vanishing bid-ask spreads. This may seem
surprising, given that an investor trades with the first encountered market-
maker, and this marketmaker could have almost all bargaining power (z close
to 1). As ρ increases, however, the investor’s outside option when bargaining
with a marketmaker improves, because he can more easily meet another mar-
ketmaker, and this sequential competition ultimately results in competitive
prices.
Part three shows that fast intermediation by a monopolistic marketmaker
does not lead to competitive prices. In fact, the bid-ask spread widens as
intermediation by marketmakers increases. This is because an investor’s
potential “threat” to search for a direct trade with another investor becomes
increasingly less persuasive, since the mass of investors with whom there are
gains from trade shrinks.
Contrary to our result, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) find that their
bargaining equilibrium (without intermediaries) does not converge to the
15This result holds, under certain conditions, even if the monopolistic marketmaker can
be approached instantly (“ρ = +∞”). In this case, for any finite λ, all trades are done
using the marketmaker, but as the investors’ outside options improve, even a monopolistic
marketmaker needs to quote competitive prices.
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competitive equilibrium as trading frictions approach zero. Gale (1987) ar-
gues that this failure is due to the fact that the total mass of agents entering
their economy is infinite, which makes the competitive equilibrium of the
total economy undefined. Gale (1987) shows that if the total mass of agents
is finite, then the economy (which is not stationary) is Walrasian in the limit.
He suggests that, when considering stationary economies, one should com-
pare the bargaining prices to those of a “flow equilibrium” rather than a
“stock equilibrium.” Our model has a natural determination of steady-state
masses, even though no agent enters the economy. This is accomplished by
considering agents whose types change over time.16 We are able to reconcile
a steady-state economy with convergence to Walrasian outcomes in both a
flow and stock sense, both for allocations and for prices, and by increasing
both investor search and marketmaker search.17
5 Numerical Example
We illustrate some of the search effects on asset pricing and marketmaking
with a numerical example. Figure 1 shows the marketmakers’ bid (B), and
ask (A) prices, as well as the inter-investor price (P ). These prices are plotted
as functions of the intensity, ρ, of meeting dealers. The top panel deals
with the case of competing marketmakers with bargaining power z = 0.8,
whereas the bottom panel treats a monopolistic marketmaker (z = 1). The
parameters underlying these graphs are as follows. First, λd = 0.1 and
λu = 1, which implies that an agent is of high liquidity type 91% of the time.
An investor finds other investors on average every two weeks, that is, λ = 26,
and selling investors have bargaining power q = 0.5. The supply is s = 0.8,
and the interest rate is r = 0.05
Since allocations become more efficient as ρ increases, in both cases, all
prices increase with ρ. Interestingly, in the case of competing marketmakers
(z = 0.8), the price increases to the Walrasian price 1/r = 20 and the bid-ask
16Gale (1986a), Gale (1986b), and McLennan and Sonnenschein (1991) show that a
bargaining game implements Walrasian outcomes in the limiting case with no frictions
(that is, no discounting) in much richer settings for preferences and goods. See also
Binmore and Herrero (1988).
17Other important differences between our framework and that of Rubinstein and Wolin-
sky (1985) are that we accommodate repeated trade, and that we diminish search frictions
explicitly through λ rather than implicitly through the discount rate. See Bester (1988,
1989) for the importance of diminishing search frictions directly.
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Figure 1: The solid line shows the price P used when investors trade with each other;
the dashed lines show the bid (B) and ask (A) prices used when investors trade with a
marketmaker. The prices are functions of the intensity (ρ) with which an investor meets a
dealer, which is plotted on a logarithmic scale. The bargaining power of the marketmaker
is z = 0.8 in the left panel, and z = 1 in the right panel.
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spread decreases to zero. In the case of a monopolist marketmaker (z = 1),
on the other hand, the prices are bounded away from 1/r = 20, and the
bid-ask spread is increasing in ρ.
The intuition for this difference is as follows. When the dealers’ contact
intensities increase, they execute more trades. Investors then find it more
difficult to contact other investors with whom to trade. If dealers have all of
the bargaining power, this leads to wider spreads. If dealers don’t have all
of the bargaining power, however, then higher marketmaker intensity leads
to a narrowing of the spread, because an investor has an improved threat of
waiting to trade with the next encountered marketmaker.
6 Heterogeneous Investors
So far, we have assumed that investors are homogeneous with respect to the
speed with which they find counterparties. In certain OTC markets, however,
some investors are more sophisticated than others, in the sense that they have
faster and easier access to counterparties. To capture this effect, we assume
that there are two different investor classes, ”sophisticated,” of total mass
µs, and “unsophisticated,” of mass 1 − µs. We assume that sophisticated
investors meet marketmakers with an intensity ρs, while unsophisticated in-
vestors meet marketmakers at intensity ρu, where ρu < ρs. We assume here
that investors cannot trade directly with each other, that is, λ = 0. If this
assumption is relaxed, and investors are able to find each other (possibly
with type-dependent speeds), then the nature of the equilibrium that we will
describe would change for certain parameters. In particular, sophisticated in-
vestors would, under certain conditions, profit from executing as many trades
as possible, and would start acting like marketmakers. This interesting effect
is beyond the scope if this paper; we focus on how marketmakers react to
differences in investor sophistication.
An investor’s type is observable to the marketmakers, who have bargain-
ing power z < 1. When a sophisticated investor meets a marketmaker, the
outcome of their bargaining is a bid price of Bs or an ask price of As.
When an unsophisticated investor needs to buy or sell, locating a mar-
ketmaker takes more time. This results in higher expected holding costs
associated with illiquidity and, importantly, implies a poor bargaining posi-
tion. Hence, unsophisticated investors receive different bid and ask prices,
which we denote by Bu and Au, respectively.
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When the supply of shares is so low that the sophisticated investors are
“marginal” buyers, then all unsophisticated investors optimally stay out of
the market, that is, they never buy any shares. Similarly, when the supply
of shares is large, sophisticated investors are marginal sellers, and all unso-
phisticated investors hold a share each, never selling. With an intermediate
supply, all investors trade, but the unsophisticated investors trade at a larger
spread.
The following theorem characterizes the most important properties of
the equilibrium with heterogeneous investors; a full characterization is in the
appendix.
Theorem 4 If s < µs λu
λu+λd
or s > 1−µs λd
λu+λd
then unsophisticated investors
do not trade. Otherwise, all investors trade, and marketmakers quote a larger
bid-ask spread to unsophisticated investors than to sophisticated investors.
That is, Au−Bu > As−Bs. In particular, an agent who meets a marketmaker
with intensity ρ faces a bid-ask of
A−B = zδ
r + λu + λd + ρ(1− z) . (15)
7 Endogenous Search and Welfare
Here, we investigate the search intensities that marketmakers would opti-
mally choose in the two cases considered above: a single monopolistic market-
maker and non-atomic competing marketmakers. We illustrate how market-
makers’ choices of search intensities depend on: (i) a marketmaker’s personal
influence on the equilibrium allocations of assets, and (ii) a marketmaker’s
bargaining power. We take investors’ search intensities as given. Consider-
ing the interactions arising if both investors and intermediaries choose search
intensities would be an interesting issue for future research.18
Because the marketmakers’ search intensities, collectively, affect the masses
µ of investor types, it is natural to take as given the initial masses, µ(0), of
investors, rather than to compare based on the different steady-state masses
corresponding to different choices of search intensities. Hence, in this section,
we are not relying on a steady-state analysis.
18Related to this, Pagano (1989) considers a one-period model in which investors choose
between searching for a counterparty and trading on a centralized market.
17
We assume that a marketmaker chooses one search intensity and abides
by it. This assumption is convenient, and can be motivated by interpreting
the search intensity as based on a technology that is difficult to change. A
full dynamic analysis of the optimal control of marketmaking intensities with
small switching costs would be interesting, but seems difficult. We merely
assume that marketmakers choose ρ so as to maximize the present value,
using their discount rate r, of future marketmaking spreads, net of the rate
Γ(ρ) of technology costs, where Γ : [0,∞) → [0,∞) is assumed for technical
convenience to be continuously differentiable, strictly convex, with Γ(0) = 0,
Γ′(0) = 0, and limρ→∞ Γ
′(ρ) = ∞.
The marketmaker’s trading profit, per unit of time, is the product of the
volume of trade, ρµm, and the bid-ask spread, A−B. Hence, a monopolistic
marketmaker who searches with an intensity of ρ has an initial valuation of
piM(ρ) = E
[∫ ∞
0
ρµm(t, ρ) (A(t, ρ)−B(t, ρ)) e−rt dt
]
− Γ(ρ)
r
, (16)
where µm = min{µlo, µhn}, and where we are using the obvious notation to
indicate dependence of the solution on ρ and t.
Any one non-atomic marketmaker does not influence the equilibrium
masses of investors, and therefore values his profit at
piC(ρ) = ρE
[∫ ∞
0
µm(t) (A(t)−B(t)) e−rt dt
]
− Γ(ρ)
r
.
An equilibrium intensity, ρC , for non-atomic marketmakers is a solution to
the first-order condition
Γ′(ρC) = rE
[∫ ∞
0
µm(t, ρ
C)
(
A(t, ρC)−B(t, ρC)) e−rt dt
]
. (17)
The following theorem characterizes equilibrium search intensities in the case
of “patient” marketmakers.
Theorem 5 There exists a marketmaking intensity ρM that maximizes piM(ρ).
There exists r¯ > 0 such that, for all r < r¯ and for each z ∈ [0, 1], unique
number ρC(z) solves (17). Moreover, ρC(0) = 0, ρC(z) is increasing in z,
and ρC(1) is larger than any solution, ρM , to the monopolist’s problem.
In addition to providing the existence of equilibrium search intensities, this
result establishes that: (i) competing marketmakers provide more market-
making services if they can capture a higher proportion of the gains from
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trade, and (ii) competing marketmakers with full bargaining power provide
more marketmaking services than a monopolistic marketmaker, since they
do not internalize the consequences of their search on the masses of investor
types.
To consider the welfare implications of marketmaking in our search econ-
omy, we adopt a notion of “social welfare,” the sum of the utilities of investors
and marketmakers. This can be interpreted as the total investor utility in
the case in which the marketmaker profits are redistributed to investors,
for instance through share holdings. With our form of linear preferences,
maximizing social welfare is a meaningful concept in that it is equivalent to
requiring that utilities cannot be Pareto improved by changing allocations
and by making initial consumption transfers.19 By “investor welfare,” we
mean the total of investors’ utilities, assuming that the marketmaker profits
are not redistributed to investors. We take “marketmaker welfare” to be the
total valuation of marketmaking profits, net of the cost of intermediation.
In our risk-neutral framework, welfare losses are easily quantified. The
total “social loss” is the cost Γ(ρ) of intermediation plus the present value
of the stream δµlo(t), t ≥ 0, of dividends wasted through mis-allocation. At
a given marketmaking intensity ρ, this leaves the social welfare
wS(ρ) = E
[∫ ∞
0
(s− δµlo(t)) e−rt dt
]
− Γ(ρ)
r
.
Investor welfare is, similarly,
wI(ρ) = E
[∫ ∞
0
(s− δµlo(t, ρ)− ρµm(t, ρ)(A(t, ρ)−B(t, ρ))) e−rt dt
]
,
and the marketmakers’ welfare is
wM(ρ) = E
[∫ ∞
0
ρµm(t, ρ)(A(t, ρ)−B(t, ρ))e−rt dt
]
− Γ(ρ)
r
.
We consider first the case of monopolistic marketmaking. We let ρM be
the level of intermediation optimally chosen by the marketmaker, and ρS
be the socially optimal level of intermediation. The relation between the
monopolistic marketmaker’s chosen level ρM of intensity and the socially
optimal intensity ρS is characterized in the following theorem.
19Also, this “utilitarian” social welfare function can be justified by considering the utility
of an agent “behind the veil of ignorance,” not knowing what type of agent he will become.
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Theorem 6 Let z = 1. (i) If investors cannot meet directly, that is, λ =
0, then the investor welfare wI(ρ) is independent of ρ, and a monopolistic
marketmaker provides the socially optimal level ρS of intermediation, that is,
ρM = ρS.
(ii) If λ > 0, then wI(ρ) decreases in ρ, and the monopolistic marketmaker
over-invests in intermediation, that is, ρM > ρS, provided q is 0 or 1.
The point of this result is that if investors cannot search, then their
utilities do not depend on the level of intermediation because the monopolist
extracts all gains from trade. In this case, because the monopolist gets
all social benefits from providing intermediation and bears all the costs, he
chooses the socially optimal level.
If, on the other hand, investors can trade directly with each other, then
the marketmaker may exploit the opportunity to invest in additional search
for trades in order to reduce the opportunities of investors to trade directly
with each other. Therefore, investor welfare decreases with ρ. Consequently,
the marketmaker’s marginal benefit from intermediation is larger than the
social benefit, so there is too much intermediation.20
We now turn to the case of non-atomic (competing) marketmakers. We
saw above that the equilibrium level of intermediation of a non-atomic mar-
ketmaker depends critically on its bargaining power. With no bargaining
power, such a marketmaker provides no intermediation. With complete bar-
gaining power, they search more than a monopolistic marketmaker would.
A government may sometimes be able to affect intermediaries’ market
power, for instance through the enforcement of regulation (DeMarzo, Fish-
man, and Hagerty (2000)). Hence, we consider the following questions: How
much marketmaker market power is socially optimal? How much market
power would the intermediaries like to have? Would investors want that
marketmakers to have some market power? These questions are answered in
the following theorem, in which we let zI , zS, and zM denote the market-
maker bargaining power that would be chosen by, respectively, the investors,
a social-welfare maximizing planner, and marketmakers.
Theorem 7 It holds that zI > 0. There is some r¯ > 0 such that, provided
r < r¯, we have zI < zS ≤ zM = 1.
20If 0 < q < 1, then increasing ρ has the additional effect of changing the relative
strength of investors’ bargaining positions with the marketmaker, because it changes their
outside options, which complicates the calculations.
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Investors in our model would prefer to enter a market in which non-atomic
marketmakers have some market power, because this gives marketmakers
an incentive to provide intermediation. The efficient level of intermediation
is achieved with a higher market power to marketmakers. Marketmakers
themselves prefer to have full bargaining power.
8 Empirical Implications
This paper lays out a theory of asset pricing and marketmaking based on
search and bargaining. We show how search-based inefficiencies affect prices
through equilibrium allocations and through the effect of search on agents’
bargaining position, that is, their outside options based on their ability to
trade with other investors or marketmakers.
Consider, for example, the OTC market for interest-rate swaps, which, ac-
cording to the British Bankers Association has open positions totally roughly
$100 trillion dollars. Customers rarely have material private information
about the current level of the underlying interest rates, so standard information-
based explanations of bid-ask spreads are not compelling in this market.
Instead, a “sales trader” sets spreads based on a customer’s (perceived) out-
side option, and would rarely fear that the customer has superior information
about the underlying interest rates. The customer’s outside option depends
on how easily he can find a counterparty himself (proxied by λ in our model),
and how easily he can access other banks (proxied by ρ in our model). To
trade OTC derivatives with a bank one needs, among other things, an ac-
count and a credit clearing. Small investors often only have an account with
one or few banks, implying that such investors have lower search options.
Hence, a testable implication of our search framework is that (small) in-
vestors with lower search options receive less competitive prices. We note
that these investors are less likely to be informed, so traditional information-
based models of spreads (for example, Glosten and Milgrom (1985)), applied
to this market, would have the opposite prediction.
The model that we present here can also be viewed as one of imperfect
competition, for example in a specialist-based equity markets. In particular,
the model shows that even a monopolistic marketmaker may have a tight
bid-ask spread if investors can easily trade directly with each other (that is,
have a high λ). This resembles situations at the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) in which there is a single specialist for each stock, but with floor
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brokers who can find each other relatively easily and trade directly, and with
outside brokers who can “find each other” and trade around the specialist
by submitting limit orders. On Nasdaq, however, a “phone market” with
several dealers for each stock, it can be difficult for investors to find each
other directly. Before the reforms in 1994, 1995, and 1997, it was difficult
for investors to compete with the Nasdaq marketmakers through limit or-
ders.21 This may help explain why spreads were higher on Nasdaq than on
NYSE (Huang and Stoll (1996)). Consistent with this view, Barclay, Christie,
Harris, Kandel, and Schultz (1999) find that the “Securities and Exchange
Commission began implementing reforms that would permit the public to
compete directly with Nasdaq dealers by submitting binding limit orders ...
Our results indicate that quoted and effective spreads fell dramatically.”
The competition faced by marketmakers from direct trade between in-
vestors can perhaps be gauged by the participation rate of marketmakers,
that is, the fraction of trades that are intermediated by a marketmaker. Our
model suggest that, with equal marketmaker availability and stock character-
istics, stocks with higher participation rates are characterized by lower search
intensity (λ) and, hence, higher bid-ask spreads. On Nasdaq, the participa-
tion rate was once large relative to the NYSE, which had a participation rate
of between 18.8% and 24.2% in the 1990s (New York Stock Exchange (2001)).
At that time, the NYSE may well have covered stocks whose investors had
higher direct contact rates (λ) than those covered, on average, by Nasdaq.
A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Start by letting
y =
λu
λu + λd
and assume that y > s. The case y ≤ s can be treated analogously. Setting
the right-hand side of Equation (3) to zero and substituting all components
of µ other than µlo in terms of µlo from Equations (1) and (2) and from
µlo + µln = λd(λd + λu)
−1 = 1− y, we obtain the quadratic equation
Q(µlo) = 0, (A.1)
21See Barclay, Christie, Harris, Kandel, and Schultz (1999) and references therein.
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where
Q(x) = 2λx2 + (2λ(y − s) + ρ+ λu + λd)x− λds. (A.2)
It is immediate that Q has a negative root (since Q(0) < 0) and has a root
in the interval (0, 1) (since Q(1) > 0).
Since µlo is the largest and positive root of a quadratic with positive
leading coefficient and with a negative root, in order to show that µlo < η
for some η > 0 it suffices to show that Q(η) > 0. Thus, in order that µho > 0
(for, clearly, µho < 1), it is sufficient that Q(s) > 0, which is true, since
Q(s) = 2λs2 + (λu + 2λ(y − s) + ρ)s.
Similarly, µln > 0 if Q(1− y) > 0, which holds because
Q(1− y) = 2λ(1− y)2 + (2λ(y − s) + ρ) (1− y) + λd(1− s).
Finally, since µhn = y − s+ µlo, it is immediate that µhn > 0.
We present a sketch of a proof of the claim that, from any admissible
initial condition µ(0) the system converges to the steady-state µ.
Because of the two restrictions (1) and (2), the system is reduced to two
equations, which can be thought of as equations in the unknowns µlo(t) and
µl(t), where µl(t) = µlo(t) + µln(t). The equation for µl(t) does not depend
on µlo(t), and admits the simple solution:
µl(t) = µl(0)e
−(λd+λu)t +
λd
(λd + λu)
(1− e−(λd+λu)t).
Define the function
G(w, x) = −2λx2− (λu +λd +2λ(1−s−w)+ρ)x+ρmax{0, s+w−1}+λds
and note that µlo satisfies
µ˙lo(t) = G(µl(t), µlo(t)).
The claim is proved by the steps:
1. Choose t1 high enough that s+µl(t)−1 does not change sign for t > t1.
2. Show that µlo(t) stays in (0, 1) for all t, by verifying that G(w, 0) > 0
and G(w, 1) < 0.
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3. Choose t2 (≥ t1) high enough that µl(t) changes by at most an arbi-
trarily chosen  > 0 for t > t2.
4. Note that, for any value µlo(t2) ∈ (0, 1), the equation
x˙(t) = G(w, x(t)) (A.3)
with boundary condition x(t2) = µlo(t2) admits a solution that converges
exponentially, as t→∞, to a positive quantity that can be written as (−b+√
b2 + c), where b and c are affine functions of w. The convergence is uniform
in µlo(t2).
5. Finally, using a comparison theorem (for instance, see Birkhoff and
Rota (1969), page 25), µlo(t) is bounded by the solutions to (A.3) corre-
sponding to w taking the highest and lowest values of µl(t) for t > t2 (these
are, of course, µl(t2) and limt→∞ µh(t)). By virtue of the previous step, for
high enough t, these solutions are within O() of the steady-state solution
µlo.

Proof of Theorem 2: In order to calculate Vσ and P , we consider a partic-
ular agent and a particular time t, let τl denote the next (stopping) time at
which that agent’s intrinsic type changes, let τi denote the next (stopping)
time at another investor with gain from trade is met, τm the next time a
marketmaker is met, and let τ = min{τl, τi, τm}. Then,
Vlo = Et
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t)(1− δ) du+ e−r(τl−t)Vho1{τl=τ}
+ e−r(τi−t) (Vln + P ) 1{τi=τ}
+ e−r(τm−t) (Vln +B) 1{τm=τ}
]
Vln = Et
[
e−r(τl−t)Vhn
]
(A.4)
Vho = Et
[∫ τl
t
e−r(u−t) du+ e−r(τl−t)Vlo
]
Vhn = Et
[
e−r(τl−t)Vln1{τl=τ} + e
−r(τi−t) (Vho − P ) 1{τi=τ}
+e−r(τm−t) (Vho − A) 1{τm=τ}
]
,
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where Et denotes expectation conditional on the information available at
time t. Differentiating both sides of Equation (A.4) with respect to t, we get
(7).
In steady-state, V˙σ = 0 and hence (7) implies the following equations for
the value functions and prices:
Vlo =
(λuVho + 2λµhnP + ρB + (2λµhn + ρ)Vln + 1− δ)
r + λu + 2λµhn + ρ
Vln =
λuVhn
r + λu
(A.5)
Vho =
(λdVlo + 1)
r + λd
Vhn =
(λdVln + (2λµlo + ρ)Vho − 2λµloP − ρA)
r + λd + 2λµlo + ρ
(We note that agents on the “long side” of market are rationed when they
interact with the marketmaker, and, therefore, their trading intensity with
the marketmaker is less than ρ. This does not affect (A.5), however, because
the price is the reservation value.) Define ∆Vl = Vlo−Vln and ∆Vh = Vho−Vhn
to be the reservation values. With this notation, the prices are determined
by
P = ∆Vl(1− q) + ∆Vhq
A = ∆Vhz +M(1− z) (A.6)
B = ∆Vlz +M(1− z)
M =
{
∆Vh if s <
λu
λu+λd
∆Vl if s >
λu
λu+λd
and M ∈ [∆Vl,∆Vh] if s = λuλu+λd . Let
ψd = λd + 2λµlo(1− q) + (1− q˜)ρ(1− z)
ψu = λu + 2λµhnq + q˜ρ(1− z) ,
where
q˜


= 1 if s < λu
λu+λd
= 0 if s > λu
λu+λd
∈ [0, 1] if s = λu
λu+λd
.
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With this notation, we see that appropriate linear combinations of (A.5)–
(A.6) yield
[
r + ψu −ψu
−ψd r + ψd
] [
∆Vl
∆Vh
]
=
[
1− δ
1
]
.
Consequently,[
∆Vl
∆Vh
]
=
1
r
[
1
1
]
− δ
r
1
r + ψu + ψd
[
r + ψd
ψd
]
, (A.7)
which leads to the price formula stated by the theorem.
Finally, we need to verify that any agent prefers, at any time, given all
information, to play the proposed equilibrium trading strategy, assuming
that other agents do. It is enough to show that an agent agrees to trade at
the candidate equilibrium prices when contacted by an investor with whom
there are potential gains from trade.
The Bellman principle for an agent of type lo in contact with an agent of
type hn, is
P + Vln ≥ Et
[ ∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t)(1− δ) du+ e−r(τl−t)Vho1{τl=τ}
+ e−r(τi−t) (Vln + P ) 1{τi=τ}
+ e−r(τm−t) (Vln +B) 1{τm=τ}
]
,
where τ = min{τl, τi, τm}. This inequality follows from that fact that ∆Vh ≥
P ≥ ∆Vl. It says that selling the asset, consuming the price, and attaining
the candidate value of a non-owner with low valuation, dominates (at least
weakly) the value of keeping the asset, consuming its dividends and collecting
the discounted expected candidate value achieved at the next time τm of a
trading opportunity or at the next time τr of a change to a low discount rate,
whichever comes first. There is a like Bellman inequality for an agent of type
hn.
Now, to verify the sufficiency of the Bellman equations for individual
optimality, consider any initial agent type σ(0), any feasible trading strategy,
θ, an adapted process whose value is 1 whenever the agent owns the asset and
0 whenever the agent does not own the asset. The type process associated
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with trading strategy θ is denoted σθ. The cumulative consumption process
Cθ associated with this trading strategy is given by
dCθt = θt
(
1− δ1{σθ(t)=lo}
)
dt− P dθt. (A.8)
Following the usual verification argument for stochastic-control, for any
future meeting time τm, m ∈ N, we have
Vσ(0) ≥ E
[∫ τm
0
e−rt dCθt
]
+ E
[
e−rτ
m
Vσθ(τm)
]
.
(This assumes without loss of generality that a potential trading contact does
not occur at time 0.) Letting m go to ∞, we have Vσ(0) ≥ U(Cθ). Because
Vσ(0) = U(C
∗), where C∗ is the consumption process associated with the
candidate equilibrium strategy, we have shown optimality.

Proof of Theorem 3: The convergence of the masses µ to µ∗ is easily
seen using (A.1), whether λ or ρ tends to infinity. Let us concentrate on the
prices.
1. If s < λu/(λu +λd), then we see using (A.1) that λµhn tends to infinity
with λ, while λµlo is bounded. Hence, Equation (A.7) shows that both ∆Vl
and ∆Vh tend to r
−1, provided that q > 0. If s > λu/(λu + λd), λµlo tends
to infinity with λ, while λµhn is bounded. Hence, ∆Vl and ∆Vh tend to
r−1(1− δ), provided that q < 1. If s = λu/(λu +λd), then λµhn = λµlo tends
to infinity with λ, and ∆Vl and ∆Vh tend to r
−1(1− δ(1− q)). In each case,
the reservation values converge to the same value, which is a Walrasian price.
2. Equation (A.7) shows that both ∆Vl and ∆Vh tend to the Walrasian
price r−1(1− δ(1− q˜)) as ρ approaches infinity.
3. When z = 1, Ak−Bk increases with ρ because A−B = δ(r+ψu+ψd)−1
and both ψu and ψd decrease, since µlo and µhn do.

Proof of Theorem 4: Let the value function of a sophisticated type-σ in-
vestor be V sσ , and the value function of an unsophisticated type-σ investor be
V uσ . These value functions and the prices (A
s, Bs, Au, Bu) are computed as
in (A.5)–(A.6), with the modification that the inter-dealer price M is differ-
ent. For any fixed inter-dealer price M , an agent who meets the marketmaker
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with intensity ρ, and who sells as a lo type and buys as a hn type (i.e. with
∆Vl ≤M ≤ ∆Vh) has value functions determined by
Vho(r + λd) = 1 + λdVlo
Vhn(r + λd + ρ) = λdVln + ρ(Vho − [z∆Vh + (1− z)M ])
Vln(r + λu) = λuVhn
Vlo(r + λu + ρ) = 1− δ + λuVho + ρ(Vln + [z∆Vl + (1− z)M ]).
The system reduces to
∆Vh(r + λd + ρ(1− z)) = 1 + λd∆Vl + ρ(1− z)M
∆Vl(r + λu + ρ(1− z)) = 1− δ + λu∆Vh + ρ(1− z)M,
which implies that[
∆Vl
∆Vh
]
=
1 + ρ(1− z)M
r + ρ(1− z)
[
1
1
]
(A.9)
− δ
r + ρ(1− z)
1
r + λu + λd + ρ(1− z)
[
r + λd + ρ(1− z)
λd
]
.
Hence, this agent faces a bid-ask spread of
z(∆Vh −∆Vl) = zδ
r + λu + λd + ρ(1− z) .
We show below, for each case, that M is given by
M =


∆V sh if s < µ
s λu
λu+λd
∆V uh if µ
s λu
λu+λd
< s < λu
λu+λd
∆V ul if
λu
λu+λd
< s < 1− µs λd
λu+λd
∆V sl if 1− µs λdλu+λd < s.
(A.10)
Case (a). Consider first the case s < µsλu/(λu+λd). The claim is that it is
an equilibrium that the unsophisticated investors do not own any shares and
do not trade. Assuming this to be true, the market has only sophisticated
investors, the interdealer price is M = ∆V sh , and the buyers are rationed.
It remains to be shown that, with this interdealer price, there is no price
at which marketmakers will sell and unsophisticated investors will buy. First
of all, we note that the optimal response of an investor to the Markov (time-
independent) investment problem can be chosen to be Markov, which means
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that one only needs to check the payoffs from Markov strategies that stipulate
the same probability of trade for a give type at any time. The linearity of
the problem further allows one to assume that the trading probability is 1
or zero. (When indifferent, the choice does not matter, so we may assume a
corner solution.)
There are three possible Markov strategies for the unsophisticated in-
vestor that involve buying: buying as type h and selling as type l, buying as
type l and selling as type h, and buying and holding (never selling).
If the unsophisticated investor buys as an h type and sells as an l type,
then her value function satisfies (A.9), implying that ∆V uh < ∆V
s
h = M since
ρu < ρs. The reservation values are even lower if she buys as an l and sells as
an h type. Finally, if the unsophisticated investor buys and never sells, then
her value function is also smaller than M . This is inconsistent with trading
with the marketmaker, meaning that she never buys.
Case (b). For the case µsh < s < µh, the equilibrium is given by an inter-
dealer price of Au = M = ∆V uh = A(ρ
u). This is also the price at which
unsophisticated hn-agents buy from the marketmaker, and these agents are
rationed. The sophisticated types hold a total µsh = µ
sλu/(λu + λd) of the
supply, while the unsophisticated types hold the rest. This is clearly an
equilibrium for the unsophisticated types. We have to ensure that sophis-
ticated t ypes also behave optimally. In particular, we have to check that
∆V sl ≤M ≤ ∆V sh . For this, we use (A.7) and (A.9):
∆V sl ≤M ⇔
1 + ρs(1− z)M
r + ρs(1− z) −
δ(r + λd + ρ
s(1− z))
r + ρs(1− z)
1
r + λu + λd + ρs(1− z) ≤M ⇔
r + λd + ρ
s(1− z)
r + λu + λd + ρs(1− z) ≥
λd
r + λu + λd + ρu(1− z)
where the last inequality is satisfied because ρs ≥ ρu. Similarly, it can be
verified that M ≤ ∆V sh using the same formulae.
Case (c). The remaining two cases are dual to the ones that we just proved.
To see this, take the following new perspective of an agent’s problem: An
agent considers “acquiring” non-ownership (that is, selling). The number of
“shares” of non-ownership is 1− s. If an l-type acquires non-ownership then
he gets a “dividend” of −(1 − δ) (that is, he gives up a dividend of 1 − δ).
If a h-type acquires non-ownership then he gets a “dividend” of −1. Said
29
differently, he gets a dividend of −(1 − δ) like the l-type, and, additionally,
he has a cost of δ. Hence, from this perspective h and l types are reversed,
and the supply of “shares” is 1− s.
This explains why the equilibria in the latter two cases are the mirror
images of the equilibria in the former two cases. In particular, if λu
λu+λd
<
s < 1−µs λd
λu+λd
, then both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors trade,
and the unsophisticated l type is rationed.
If 1− µs λd
λu+λd
< s, each unsophisticated investor owns a share and does
not trade. (Using the alternative perspective, they are out of the market
for non-ownership). The sophisticated investors hold the remaining (1− µs)
shares, they trade, and the selling sophisticated investors are rationed.

Proof of Theorem 5:
There exists a number ρM that maximizes (16) since piM is continuous
and piM(ρ) → −∞ as ρ→∞.
We are looking for ρC ≥ 0 such that
Γ′(ρC) = rE
∫ ∞
0
µm(ρ
C)(A(ρC)−B(ρC))e−rt dt. (A.11)
Consider how both the left and right-hand sides depend on ρ. The left-hand
side is 0 for ρ = 0, increasing, and tends to infinity as ρ tends to infinity. For
z = 0, A(t, ρ) − B(t, ρ) = 0 everywhere, so the the right-hand side (RHS)
is zero, and, therefore, the unique solution to (A.11) is clearly ρC = 0. For
z > 1, the RHS is strictly positive for ρ = 0. Further, the steady-state
value of the RHS can be seen to be decreasing, using the fact that µm is
decreasing in ρ, and using the explicit expression for the spread provided by
(A.7). Further, by continuity and still using (A.7), there is ε > 0 and T
such that ∂
∂ρ
µm(A − B) < −ε for all t > T and all r. Further, note that
r exp(−rt) is a density function for all r, and that the closer r is to zero, the
more weight is given to high values of t (that is, the more important is the
steady-state value for the integral). Therefore, the RHS is also decreasing in
ρ for any initial condition on µ if r is small enough. These results yield the
existence of a unique solution.
To see that ρC > ρM when z = 1, consider the first-order conditions that
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determine ρM :
Γ′(ρM) = rE
∫ ∞
0
[
µm(t, ρ
M)(A(t, ρM)−B(t, ρM)) (A.12)
+ρM
∂
∂ρM
(
µm(t, ρ
M)(A(t, ρM)−B(t, ρM))) ]e−rt dt.
The integral of the first integrand term on the right-hand side of (A.12) is
the same as that of (A.11), and that of the second is negative for small r.
Hence, the right-hand side of (A.12) is smaller than the right-hand side of
(A.11), implying that ρC(1) > ρM .
To see that ρC(z) is increasing in z, we use the Implicit Function Theorem
and the dominated convergence theorem to compute the derivative of ρC(z)
with respect to z, as
rE
∫∞
0
µm(ρ
C)(Az(ρ
C , z)−Bz(ρC , z))e−rt dt
Γ′′(ρC)− rE ∫∞
0
d
dρ
µm(ρC)(A(ρC , z)−B(ρC , z))e−rt dt
. (A.13)
If we use the steady-state expressions for µ, A, and B, this expression is seen
to be positive because both the denominator and the numerator are positive.
Hence, it is also positive with any initial masses if we choose r small enough.

Proof of Theorem 6: (i) The first part of the theorem, that the monopolis-
tic marketmaker’s search intensity does not affect investors when they can’t
search for each other, follows from (A.5), which shows that investor’s utility
is independent of ρ.
(ii) We want to prove that the investor welfare is decreasing in ρ, which
directly implies that the marketmaker over-invests in intermediation services.
We introduce the notation ∆Vo = Vho − Vlo, ∆Vn = Vhn − Vln, and φ =
∆Vh−∆Vl = ∆Vo−∆Vn, and start by proving a few general facts about the
marketmaker spread, φ.
The dynamics of φ are given by the ordinary differential equation (ODE)
φ˙t = (r + λd + λu + 2λ(1− q)µlo + 2λqµhn)φt − δ,
Let R = r + λd + λu + 2λ(1 − q)µlo + 2λqµhn. The equation above readily
implies that
∂φ˙t
∂ρ
= R
∂φt
∂ρ
+
(
2λ(1− q)∂µlo(t)
∂ρ
+ 2λq
∂µhn(t)
∂ρ
)
φt. (A.14)
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This can be viewed an ODE in the function ∂φ
∂ρ
by treating φt is a fixed
function. It can be verified that 0 < ∂φ
∂ρ
< ∞ in the limit as t → ∞,
that is, in steady state. Further, a simple comparison argument yields that
∂µlo(t)
∂ρ
= ∂µhn(t)
∂ρ
< 0. Hence, the solution to the linear ODE (A.14) is positive
since
∂φt
∂ρ
= −
∫ ∞
t
e−R(u−t)
(
2λ(1− q)∂µlo(u)
∂ρ
+ 2λq
∂µhn(u)
∂ρ
)
φu du > 0.
Consider now the case q = 1, for which, since Vhn = Vln = 0,
V˙ho(t) = rVho(t) + λdφt − 1 .
Differentiating both sides with respect to ρ and using arguments as above,
we see that ∂Vho(t)
∂ρ
< 0 since ∂φt
∂ρ
> 0. Consequently, Vlo(t) = Vho(t)− φt also
decreases in ρ.
If q = 0, then (A.5) shows that Vlo and Vho are independent of ρ. Further,
V˙ln(t) = rVln(t) + λu(φt −∆Vo(t)).
As above, we differentiate with respect to ρ and conclude that Vln(t) decreases
in ρ since ∂φt
∂ρ
> 0 and ∆Vo(t) is independent of ρ. Consequently, Vhn(t) =
Vln(t)− φt + ∆Vo(t) also decreases in ρ.

Proof of Theorem 7:
To see that zI > 0, we note that with ρ = ρC(z),
d
dz
wI
∣∣
z=0 = −δE
∫ ∞
0
d
dρ
µlo(t, ρ)e
−rt dt
dρC
dz
> 0,
where we have used that ρC(0) = 0, that dρ
C
dz
> 0 at z = 0 (see (A.13)), that
A−B = 0 if z = 0, and that for all t, d
dρ
µlo(t, ρ) < 0.
To prove that zI < zS ≤ zM = 1, it suffices to show that the marketmaker
welfare is increasing in z, which follows from
d
dz
wM = ρ
d
dz
[
E
∫ ∞
0
µlo(a− b)e−rt dt
]
=
ρ
r
d
dz
Γ′(ρC(z))
=
ρ
r
Γ′′(ρC(z))
dρC
dz
> 0,
32
suppressing the arguments t and ρ from the notation, where we have used
twice the fact that Γ′(ρ) = rE
∫∞
0
µlo(A − B)e−rt dt if ρ = ρC(z), and that
dρC
dz
> 0 (Theorem 5).

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